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To study the impact of macroprudential policy on credit supply cycles and real effects, 
we analyze dynamic provisioning. Introduced in Spain in 2000, revised four times and 
tested in its counter-cyclicality during the crisis, it affected banks differentially. We 
find that dynamic provisioning smooths credit supply cycles and, in bad times, 
supports firm performance. A one-percentage point increase in capital buffers extends 
credit to firms by 9 pp, increasing firm employment (6 pp) and survival (1 pp). 
Moreover, there are important compositional effects in credit supply related to risk and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Banking crises are recurrent phenomena that generally come after periods of strong 
credit growth (Kindleberger (1978), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), Schularick and 
Taylor (2012)). Their damaging real effects (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)) have 
generated a broad agreement among academics and policymakers that financial 
regulation needs to get a macroprudential dimension that aims to lessen the negative 
externalities from the financial to the macro real sector, as in a credit crunch caused by 
the weakening in banks’ balance-sheets (Bernanke (1983)). 
Time-varying macroprudential policy tools can be used to address these cyclical 
vulnerabilities in systemic risk (Yellen (2011)). Under the new international regulatory 
framework for banks ‒ Basel III ‒ regulators agreed to vary minimum capital 
requirements over the cycle, by instituting countercyclical bank capital buffers (i.e., 
procyclical capital requirements), which aim to achieve two macroprudential 
objectives at once. 1  First, boosting equity or provisioning requirements in booms 
provides additional (countercyclical) buffers in downturns that can help mitigate credit 
crunches. Second, higher requirements on bank own funds can cool credit-led booms, 
either due to the higher cost of bank capital or because banks internalize more of the 
potential social costs of credit defaults (via lower moral hazard by having more “skin 
in the game”).2 Countercyclical buffers could hence lessen the excessive procyclicality 
of credit, i.e., those credit cycles that find their root causes in banks’ agency frictions.3 
Smoothing credit supply cycles will cause positive firm-level real effects if bank-firm 
relationships are valuable and credit substitution for firms is difficult in bad times. 
Despite the attention now given by academics and policymakers alike to the global 
development of macroprudential policies, no empirical study so far has estimated the 
impact of a time-varying macroprudential policy tool on the supply of credit and the 
                                                 
1 The common terminology we follow is that procyclical capital requirements generate countercyclical capital 
buffers that deal with the procyclicality of credit by the banking system. See Borio (2003), Hanson et al. 
(2011), Kashyap et al. (2011) and Dewatripont and Tirole (2012). 
2 Diamond and Rajan (2001), Morrison and White (2005), Shleifer and Vishny (2010), Tirole (2011) and 
Malherbe (2015). Tax benefits of debt finance, public guarantees and asymmetric information about banks’ 
conditions imply that equity finance may be more costly for banks than debt finance (Freixas and Rochet 
(2008), Aiyar et al. (2014)). Admati and Hellwig (2013) question whether capital costs for banks are high. 
3 As in Guttentag and Herring (1984), Rajan (1994), Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Berger and Udell (2004), 
Ruckes (2004), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006), Diamond and Rajan (2006), Allen and Gale (2007), Adrian 
and Shin (2011), Gersbach and Rochet (2012) and Harris et al. (2015). Credit cycles also stem from firms’ 
agency frictions as in Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Lorenzoni (2008), Jeanne 
and Korinek (2012), Farhi and Werning (2014) and Korinek and Simsek (2016), though these models can also 
be interpreted as dealing with banks with agency problems in their borrowing from final investors. Hence, 
macroprudential policy limits exposures of both lenders and borrowers (see also Freixas et al. (2015)). 
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associated spillovers on real activity in both good and bad times. This paper aims to 
fill this void by analyzing a series of pioneering policy experiments with dynamic 
provisioning in Spain: 4 From its introduction in 2000:Q3, and change in 2005:Q1 
during good times, to its later performance when a severe (mostly unforeseen) crisis 
shock struck thus allowing to test the countercyclical nature of the policy, and also the 
changes in bad times (two reductions in 2008:Q4 and in 2009:Q4, and an ad hoc 
increase in provisions in 2012:Q1 and Q2). These shocks coupled with unique bank-, 
firm-, and loan-level (including loan application) data allow for identification. 
Dynamic provisions ‒ called “dynamic” as they vary over the cycle and “statistical” 
or “generic” as a formula is mandating their calculation ‒ are forward-looking: Before 
any credit loss is recognized on an individual loan, a buffer (i.e., the dynamic 
provision fund) is built up from retained profits in good times to cover the realized 
losses in bad times (i.e., when specific provisions surpass its formula-based average 
over a credit cycle). The dynamic provision fund has a regulatory ceiling and floor. 
The required provisioning in good times is over and above the specific loan loss 
provisions and there is a regulatory reduction of this provisioning in bad times, when 
bank profits are low and new shareholders’ funds are costly to obtain. Dynamic 
provision funds are now Tier-2 regulatory capital. Hence, dynamic provisions are pro-
cyclical, thus constituting counter-cyclical capital buffers that can be used in crisis 
times.5 
The policy experiment in good times we focus on is the introduction of dynamic 
provisioning in 2000:Q3, which by construction entailed an additional non-zero 
provision requirement for most banks, but ‒ and this is crucial for our estimation 
purposes ‒ with a widely different formula-based provision requirement across banks. 
Next, we analyze the countercyclical workings of the dynamic provision funds built up 
by the banks as of 2007:Q4 following the crisis shock in 2008:Q3, and we also follow 
a series of policy experiments in bad times, i.e., the sudden lowering of the floor of the 
dynamic provision funds from 33 to 10% in 2008:Q4 and to 0% in 2009:Q4 (that 
allowed for a greater release of buffers for many banks) and, given that the overall pre-
crisis level of provisions was relatively low (1.25% of total credit) and basically 
                                                 
4 There is almost no real experience on how such policies work along a credit cycle. Most of the discussions 
are theoretical, simulations (Repullo et al. (2010)) or policy papers (see e.g. the IMF paper by Lim et al. 
(2011)). Also new policies like stress tests cannot be analyzed yet over a full cycle. Moreover, we designate 
the policy changes as “experiments”, though macro-policy shocks to the banking sector are never 
(intentionally) randomized. Therefore, both shocks and comprehensive data are necessary for identification. 
5 See Saurina (2009b) for a detailed explanation of dynamic provisions` rationale and workings. 
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depleted in 2011, the 2012 increase in provisioning that banks needed to make based 
on their exposure to construction and real-estate firms to clean up their balance sheets. 
To identify the availability of credit and the associated real effects, we employ a 
comprehensive credit register that comprises bank-firm level data on all outstanding 
business loan contracts and balance sheets of all banks collected by the supervisor, in 
conjunction with firm-level data from the Spanish Mercantile Register. We calculate 
the total credit exposures by each bank to each firm in each quarter, from 1999:Q1 to 
2013:Q3, a time period which allows us to study the impact of dynamic provisions 
along a full cycle, with an unexpected crisis in the middle.6 We analyze changes in 
committed credit volume, on both the intensive and extensive margins, and also credit 
drawn, maturity, collateral and cost. We also use loan applications made by firms to 
new banks to analyze substitution effects. Depending on their credit portfolio, banks 
were differentially affected by the various policy experiments. Therefore, we perform 
a difference-in-difference analysis where we compare before and after each shock 
differently affected banks’ lending at the same time to the same firm (Khwaja and 
Mian (2008), Jiménez et al. (2012)). Though we analyze the same bank (-firm) before 
and after the shock, in robustness we further control for up to 32 bank variables and 
key bank-firm and loan characteristics. We also exploit differences across various 
subsamples, components of the risk formula, and regulation (i.e., foreign branches in 
Spain were not regulated with respect to dynamic provisioning). Finally, by matching 
credit with firm balance sheets and the register on firm deaths, we also assess the 
effects on firm-level total assets, employment and survival. 
In good times we find that banks that have to provision more cut committed credit 
more to the same firm after the shock ‒ and not before ‒ than other banks. These 
findings also hold for the extensive margin of credit and for credit drawn, maturity, 
collateral, and credit drawn over committed (an indirect measure of the cost of credit). 
Hence, procyclical bank capital regulation in good times contracts credit supply. 
                                                 
6 From 1999 to 2008 Spain went through a strong credit expansion and from 2008 onwards suffered a severe 
recession. In 2007, all major central banks, international organizations and private forecasters forecasted 
strong economic growth in 2008. The GDP in Spain grew by 3.6% in 2007, but by 0.9% in 2008, and after 
2008, GDP contracted 3.7% in 2009 and the unemployment rate jumped to more than 25%. In 2010 Spain 
slightly came out of its recession but went back in from 2011 to 2013. In this regard Spain is indeed very well 
suited to test whether macroprudential instruments have an impact on the lending cycle and on real activity. 
In 1999 Spain had the lowest ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans among all OECD countries, but as a 
consequence of the introduction of dynamic provisioning, prior to the crisis in 2008 it was placed among the 
highest. 
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These findings are robust. For example, first, we apply the new provision formula to 
each bank’s credit portfolio in 1998:Q4, well before any discussion on the policy had 
taken place, rather than in 2000:Q3 when dynamic provisioning became compulsory. 
Second, we exclude banks of direct interest to policy-makers, i.e., the savings or the 
very large banks, as policy-makers capable of accurately predicting the heterogeneous 
changes in bank credit could have devised the formula to maximize its impact. Third, 
to allay any remaining endogeneity concerns, we exploit the opposite implications of 
the formula related to bank risk and also assess how unregulated foreign branches react 
as compared to what regulated foreign subsidiaries or domestic banks do. Fourth, to 
understand the economic channel, we analyze how credit responds to realized overall 
provisions instrumented with the formula-based provisioning. Fifth, by using firm 
observables, firm fixed effects or no firm controls, we assess the degree to which the 
credit supply shock is orthogonal to observed and unobserved demand fundamentals. 
But are firms really affected in good times? We find mostly not. Though total 
committed credit availability by firms drops immediately following the introduction of 
dynamic provisioning, three quarters after there is no discernible contraction of credit 
available to firms, as firms easily substitute credit from less affected banks (from both 
new banks and banks with an existing relationship). Consistently we find no impact on 
firm total assets, employment, or survival. 
Yet, while average firms are not significantly affected, there are important changes in 
the allocation of credit supply. After the policy shock, banks with higher requirements 
focus their credit supply more to firms with a higher ex-ante interest paid and leverage, 
and with higher ex-post default, thus suggesting that higher capital requirements may 
increase bank risk-taking and searching-for-yield. This may be an unexpected but 
likely unintended consequence of this regulatory intervention (consistent with Koehn 
and Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), Gale and Özgür (2005), Gale 
(2010)). Moreover, the negative impact of higher requirements on credit is stronger for 
smaller firms and banks, that struggle more to absorb the shock. 
In bad times things look very different. Banks with higher pre-crisis dynamic 
provision funds stemming from policy increase their supply of committed credit to the 
same firm permanently over the whole period 2009-10 (i.e., capital buffers mitigate the 
credit crunch). Similar findings hold for credit continuation, drawn and drawn over 
committed (i.e., implying a lower cost of credit), and again for numerous alterations in 
specification and instrumentation (as for example instrumenting pre-crisis buffers with 
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initial policy provisioning from 2000). Results moreover suggest that the mechanism 
at work is through saving capital in crisis times when profits and shareholder funds are 
scarce and costly. In addition, banks with dynamic provision funds below ceiling (and 
hence that benefited most from the lowering of the floor in 2008:Q4 and in 2009:Q4 as 
they can immediately release capital funds) increase their credit supply only in the 
quarters around the policy changes. These banks also tighten maturity and collateral, 
possibly to compensate for the higher risk taken by easing volume. 
Strikingly different in bad times (from good times) is that the changes in bank-firm 
level credit are binding at the firm-level; credit availability permanently contracts more 
for those firms that borrowed more from banks that when the crisis hit had lower 
dynamic provision funds stemming from policy. Results with granting of loan 
applications show that firms cannot substitute for lost bank financing. Consistent with 
this, we find that firm total employment and survival are negatively affected as well. 
The estimates also imply economical relevancy. Firms dealing with banks holding 1 
percentage point (pp) more in dynamic provisioning funds (over loans) receive 9 pp 
more in committed credit than when dealing with other banks, have a 6 pp higher 
growth in the number of employees and a 1 pp higher likelihood of survival. In sum, 
banks with higher capital buffers, stemming from the stricter regulatory requirements 
in good times that can be drawn down in bad times, partly mitigate the deleterious 
impact of the financial crisis on the supply of credit and the associated real effects. 
Compositional changes in credit supply are again important. Bank risk-taking also 
differs between higher pre-crisis capital buffers versus softer requirements on lowly 
capitalized banks. In the latter case more credit is supplied to more levered and longer-
relationship firms, consistent with risk-shifting strategies related to zombie lending or 
gambling for resurrection. Hence, real and risk-taking effects are not the same when 
the regulator increases requirements in good times to have higher buffers in bad times, 
than when she simply reduces them in bad times. Moreover, the positive effects on 
credit supply from countercyclical buffers are lower when bank non-performing loans 
and leverage ratios are higher, thus suggesting a binding market constraint for weaker 
banks despite the policy softening. 
Finally, we analyze the increase in provisions in 2012 that banks had to make based 
on their lending exposure in 2011 to construction and real-estate firms. The impact on 
credit supplied to firms not in construction or real-estate is immediate and binding 
(again the granting of loan applications show that credit substitution is difficult). These 
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firms are subsequently negatively affected in their survival. Firms that dealt with banks 
that on average face 1 pp more tightening in requirements suffer a contraction of at 
least 4 pp in committed credit availability and a 1 pp of survival. Significant effects are 
only after the policy change and not before. Moreover, the credit crunch is softer by 
lowly capitalized banks with high NPLs ratios and for firms with worse credit history 
and profits, consistent with risk-shifting by the banks more affected by the policy. 
To conclude. Responding to the urgent interest among policymakers and academics, 
ours is the first empirical paper to actually estimate the impact of a macroprudential 
policy on credit supply cycles and their associated real effects. The robust evidence 
shows that countercyclical bank capital buffers mitigate cycles in credit supply and 
have a positive effect on firm-level aggregate financing and performance. In bad times 
switching between banks is difficult, thus firms will be more affected by capital 
shocks. Hence, both the aggregate level of capital and its distribution across banks 
matters. Not only do policy constraints matter, but also market constraints as the 
results on bank NPLs and leverage suggest. Importantly, tightening capital 
requirements in bad times is much more contractive for credit and real output than it is 
in good times. Building up capital buffers before the crisis is superior in terms of 
maintaining real activity and avoiding risk-shifting than changing requirements (for 
lowly capitalized banks) during the crisis, as the evidence from the floor reductions in 
2008-09 and the increase in 2012 suggest. However, a capital tightening in good times 
can induce both risk-taking by regulated banks (that supply more credit to firms with 
higher both ex-ante yield and leverage and ex-post defaults) and regulatory arbitrage 
by non-regulated and regulated-but-less-affected banks.7 Macroprudential policy can 
target the main sources of systemic risk as compared to monetary policy (Jiménez et 
al. (2014b)), but there can be regulatory arbitrage. 
                                                 
7 Differences with the bank capital literature are many: (1) We study policy changes that exogenously vary 
the regulatory capital requirements in good and bad times and the workings of countercyclical capital buffers 
when a crisis hits. In contrast, Peek and Rosengren (2000) exploit the negative shocks to the profitability of 
multinational banks. Chodorow-Reich (2014) focuses on credit during the crisis and employment outcomes 
for a reduced subset of firms. (2) We identify the supply of credit with loan-level data. Bernanke and Lown 
(1991) and Berger and Udell (1994) rely on macro or bank-level data. (3) We assess the impact on bank-firm 
level credit availability, maturity, collateralization, and cost, and on firm-level financing and real 
performance. And, (4) we analyze compositional changes in credit supply (notably on risk-taking), and real 
effects for virtually all firms in the economy. Both risk-taking and the externalities to the real sector may be 
more important for financial stability than the topics dealt with in the bank capital literature so far. 
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II. DYNAMIC PROVISIONING, DATA AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
1. Dynamic Provisioning as a Countercyclical Tool  
Dynamic provisioning requirements in Spain are formula-based (Saurina (2009a)). 
Total loan loss provisions for each quarter are the sum of: (1) Specific provisions 
based on the amount of non-performing loans at each point in time; plus (2) a general 
provision which is proportional to the amount of the increase in the loan portfolio and; 
finally plus (3) a general countercyclical provision element based on the comparison of 
the average of specific provisions along the last lending cycle (for the whole banking 
sector) with the current specific provision (for each individual bank). The per-period 
(the flow of) General Provisions are computed as: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼∆𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 + �𝛽𝛽 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 � 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 (1) 
where Loanst is the stock of loans at the end of period t and ∆Loanst its variation from 
the end of period t-1 to the end of period t (positive in a lending expansion, negative in 
a credit decline). α and β are parameters set by the Banco de España, the Spanish 
banking regulator. α is an estimate of the percent latent loss in the loan portfolio, while 
β is the average along the cycle of specific provisions in relative terms. In good times, 
specific provisions are low – thus below the cycle average β – and hence flows are 
positive, thus increasing the buffer. By the same reasoning, in bad times, flows will be 
negative, thus allowing the countercyclical buffer to be used. Therefore, the second 
term of the formula is the key counter-cyclical component. 
The above formula is a simplification. There are six homogeneous risk buckets to 
take into account the different nature of the distinct segments of the credit market, each 
of them with a different α and β parameter that is increasing in risk levels, calibrated 
based on the previous credit cycle. Consumer credit is put in the highest risk bucket, 
business loans and mortgages are in intermediate ones, and public debt is in the lowest 
risk bucket. Moreover, there is a ceiling for the fund of general loan loss provisions 
fixed at 125% of the product of parameter α and the total volume of credit exposures 
(i.e., 125% of the latent loss of the loan portfolio). The objective is to avoid an excess 
of provisioning, which might occur in a very long expansionary phase as specific 
provisions remain below the β component. 
There was also a minimum floor value for the fund of general provisions at 33% of 
the latent loss. This minimum was lowered in 2008:Q4 to 10% and in 2009:Q4 to 0% 
in order to allow for more usage of the general provisions previously built in the 
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expansionary period (we study both events later).8 Banks are also required to publish 
the amount of their dynamic provision each quarter. Moreover, in case of liquidation 
of a bank, general provisions correspond to shareholders. Therefore, as dynamic 
provisions (as said) are a special kind of general loan loss provision, the buffer they 
accumulate in the expansion phase can be assimilated to a capital buffer. From 2005 
onwards, dynamic provisions were also formally considered to be Tier-2 capital 
(regulatory capital, although not as core as equity). 
Figure 1 shows over time the flow of total net loan provisions (Panel A), the stock of 
NPLs over total loans (Panel B), and the stocks of total, specific and general dynamic 
provisions over total loans (Panel C), highlighting the introduction in July 2000, the 
reduction in 2005, and the increase during the crisis (we analyze all shocks indicated 
by dashed vertical lines in Figure 1). So then why would dynamic provisioning and the 
resultant countercyclical capital buffers be beneficial for the economy? First note that 
in Panel C total provisions grow at a substantial lower speed than specific provisions 
in crisis times due to the fact that dynamic provisioning funds are reduced (flows are 
negative so the stock is reduced). This implies that exactly at the time when bank 
profits are very low or even negative and access to equity funds costly, banks can draw 
down the buffers that were built up in good times. These buffers should, therefore, 
reduce the costs (and increase the quantity) of financing for banks, which they could 
pass on to their borrowers. Indeed, Laeven and Majnoni (2003) find that in most 
countries banks’ total provisioning occurred mostly in crisis times and conjecture that 
this will magnify the pro-cyclicality of bank lending. Dynamic provisioning by 
building the buffers in good times could help to reduce the credit crunch in bad times. 
Note also that in 2010 the speed of total provisions and specific provisions are very 
similar (i.e., identical slopes) because at that time the dynamic provisioning funds are 
almost depleted. The crisis shock was very large as compared to the relatively small 
ex-ante buffer of dynamic provisions the banks had in place (approximately 1% of 
total assets and 84% of total provisions in 2007:Q4), so these provisions were almost 
depleted by the end of 2010 (only 11% of total provisions in 2010:Q4 remained). 
Finally, given that the dynamic provision funds were depleted, in 2012 the new 
                                                 
8 Banks for which the formula states that their provision funds should be higher than the ceiling can have 
provision funds at the ceiling, but – due to the higher formula value – in crisis times they cannot release funds 
as fast as banks with theoretical values below the ceiling. See also Fernández de Lis et al. (2000) and Banco 
de España (2004). 
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government increased provisioning based on real estate exposure in a one-off 
movement to clean up banks’ balance sheets. 
2. Datasets 
Spain offers an ideal experimental setting for identification; not only because of the 
policy experiments with dynamic provisioning, but also since its economic system is 
bank dominated and its exhaustive but confidential credit register called CIR (which is 
used by the Banco de España for supervision) records all bank lending activity over 
the last full credit cycle matched with firm and bank balance sheet-data (Jiménez et al. 
(2014a)). We work with commercial and industrial (C&I) loans granted by commercial 
banks, savings banks and credit cooperatives (representing almost the entire Spanish 
banking system) to non-financial publicly limited and limited liability companies. We 
use all C&I loans (covering 80% of total loans) granted by more than 175 banks to 
100,000 firms. The CIR is almost comprehensive, as the monthly reporting threshold 
for a loan is only 6,000 Euros, which alleviates any concerns about unobserved 
changes in bank credit to SMEs. We also use loan application level data to analyze 
credit substitution in the extensive margin (Jiménez et al. (2014b)). 
We match each loan to bank balance-sheet variables (size, capital, liquidity, NPLs, 
profits, real estate exposure and other key variables as explained in the next sections) 
and to selected firm variables (firm identity, industry, location, size, age, capital, 
liquidity, profits, tangible assets, and whether or not the firm survives). We also 
analyze the loans that cannot be matched to firm variables. Both loan and bank data are 
owned by the Banco de España in its role of supervisor (the data is confidential but the 
results of the paper can be replicated, see the Online Appendix for details). The firms’ 
dataset is available from the Spanish Mercantile Register at a yearly frequency (and 
represents around 70% of outstanding bank loans from the CIR, though we lose 30% 
more when analyzing firm employment). Firm survival data come from the Central 
Business Register (DIRCE). Firm balance sheet data are until 2011:Q4 whereas 
survival is until 2012:Q4 and loan and bank-level data are until 2013:Q3. 
3. Identification Strategy 
We study the impact of the policy experiments regarding dynamic provisioning on 
credit availability both at loan and firm level and the associated firm-level real effects. 
As the dynamic provisioning formula is based on different risk buckets that depend on 
the loan portfolio and banks differ in their lending, banks face different provisioning 
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requirements from the policy changes. We explain each shock and specification we run 
in detail in Sections III and IV. For each shock we calculate the changes in each bank’s 
provisioning requirement. As the policy shocks across banks cannot be considered 
“random”, the data and empirical strategy are crucial. We perform a difference-in-
difference analysis where we compare the lending of the same bank before and after 
each shock and simultaneously compare it to other banks differently affected by the 
shock – the identification comes both from the timing (before and after the shock) and 
from the shocks that affected banks differentially. 
Even though we analyze the same bank before and after the shock (which is similar 
to including bank fixed effects), we also need to control for bank fundamentals that 
could be differently affected. First, borrowers may differ and we analyze the change in 
credit availability to the same firm at the same time by banks with different treatment 
intensity to each shock by using firm or firm-time fixed effects in loan-level 
regressions (Khwaja and Mian (2008)). In this way, we capture both observed and 
unobserved time-varying heterogeneity in firm fundamentals (i.e., credit demand and 
as firms often engage similar banks also the characteristics of the bank’s portfolio 
composition). Second, we analyze whether the estimated coefficient is different from 
the one estimated in a regression without firm fixed effects (and even without any firm 
variables) to analyze whether the policy shock is orthogonal to borrowers’ demand and 
thus whether firm level regressions with only firm observables yield any implications 
for credit availability (Jiménez et al. (2014a)). Third, in robustness we control for up to 
32 bank variables covering all relevant characteristics of banks, and include bank-firm 
and loan variables (as loans by different banks to the same firm could be different). 
To address any remaining endogeneity concerns we further exclude either the savings 
banks or the very large banks as policy makers could have devised the formula to 
maximize the credit impact at either one of these groups of banks, instrument dynamic 
provisioning in each experiment with pertinent formula-determined prior values, and 
add bank fixed effects in cross-sectional specifications that assess the compositional 
changes in credit supply. And while domestic banks and foreign subsidiaries were 
subject to dynamic provision requirements, foreign branches were not (foreign 
branches have to report all loans to the CIR, but are not regulated in their capital and 
accounting in Spain). We therefore assess these two groups of treated versus non-
treated banks in their lending to the same firm at the same time. We also analyze 
foreign subsidiaries versus branches. Moreover, we exploit the opposite implications 
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of the formula related to higher bank risk to check whether it is the policy (formula) or 
risk driving the results. Finally, we analyze the changes in credit on the changes in 
realized overall bank provisions, which is instrumented in a first stage with the 
deterministic formula-based provisioning. 
III. IN GOOD TIMES: INTRODUCTION OF DYNAMIC PROVISIONING 
1. The Specifics of the Introduction of Dynamic Provisioning in 2000:Q3 
Dynamic provisioning was introduced in Spain in 2000:M7 and enforced at the end 
of 2000:M9 (our first policy experiment), as Spain had very low levels of provisioning 
compared to the rest of the OECD countries. We apply the provisioning formula that is 
introduced to the existing loan portfolio in 1998:Q4 (except for the consumer credit 
component as we do not have the individual loans), without taking into account the 
specific provision component to avoid endogeneity, yielding a bank-specific amount of 
new funds that is expected to be provisioned. We then scale this amount by the bank’s 
total assets. We label this scaled amount in provisions for bank b, Dynamic 
Provision(for 1998:Q4)b, abbreviated in interaction terms by DPb (Table A.1 collects 
all variable definitions). We go back two years to avoid self-selection problems, i.e., 
banks changing their credit portfolio weights before the law enters into force. 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that there is ample variation in the dynamic 
provisions (over total assets) that banks have to make. The mean of the banks’ 
Dynamic Provision is 0.26%, its median 0.22, and the standard deviation 0.10, ranging 
from a maximum of 0.86 to a minimum value of 0%. Not reported is how Dynamic 
Provision varies across banks’ characteristics. Banks with a lower liquidity ratio were 
facing higher dynamic provisioning, and so were commercial banks (more than 
savings banks and cooperatives). In addition, banks that had to provision more did not 
decrease Tier-1 capital. Moreover, regressing Dynamic Provision on firm observables 
implies the following: When no controls are included, less capitalized and smaller 
firms are more likely to work with less affected banks; when only firm province and 
industry fixed effects are added as controls, all the firm variables are insignificant.  
2. Loan-Level Results 
The first model at the loan level we estimate is: 
∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶(2000:𝑄𝑄1 − 2001:𝑄𝑄2)𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏  = 𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏 + 𝛽𝛽 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 1998:𝑄𝑄4)𝑏𝑏 + 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 +  𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 (2) 
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where ∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the change in the logarithm of (strictly positive) 
committed credit by bank b to firm f over the impact period from 2000:Q1 to 2001:Q2, 
𝛿𝛿𝑏𝑏  are firm fixed effects, and 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏  can include other bank and bank-firm 
relationship characteristics which comprise Ln(Total Assets), Capital Ratio, Liquidity 
Ratio, ROA, Doubtful Ratio, in addition to Commercial Bank and Savings Bank 
dummies, and Ln(1+Number of months with the bank).9 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏 is the error term and β the 
main coefficient of interest. This model will be estimated for a sample of 416,611 
observations from bank-firm pairs of firms with multiple bank-firm relationships. 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank and firm level (clustering at the bank level 
yields virtually identical results). We also estimate this model for different lending 
margins and assess quarter by quarter outcomes (to test for pre-trends and short- and 
medium-term policy effects). And in robustness we vary controls and subsamples. 
The estimated coefficient on Dynamic Provision in Model 1 in Table 2, which equals 
-0.357***, is both statistically significant and economically relevant. A one standard 
deviation increase in Dynamic Provision (i.e., 0.10%) relatively cuts committed 
lending by 4 pp. That is a sizable effect, as committed lending on the intensive margin 
contracted by 2% on average from 2000:Q1 to 2001:Q2. Next we add firm * bank type 
(i.e., commercial, savings and other bank) fixed effects in Model 2 (limiting the used 
sample to firms that borrow from multiple banks of the same type) and then loan 
characteristics in Model 3. The coefficients on Dynamic Provision equal -0.397*** 
and -0.335***, respectively. Results remain virtually unaffected if we add to the 
parsimonious set of controls the following five additional bank characteristics that 
proxy for bank risk-taking: Loans to Deposits Ratio, Construction, Real Estate and 
Mortgages over Total Assets, Net Interbank Position over Total Assets, Securitized 
Assets over Total Assets and the Regulatory Capital Ratio. The estimated coefficient 
(untabulated) then equals -0.305***. Adding squared and cubed terms of all bank 
characteristics (in total 32 terms) leaves the estimate of the coefficient on Dynamic 
Provision again mostly unaffected, i.e., -0.328**. Moreover, when none of the firm 
characteristics (i.e., firm fixed effects, province and industry fixed effects, firm 
variables) are included in the specification, the estimated coefficient equals then -
0.290** which is statistically not different from the estimate obtained with firm fixed 
effects in Model (1), i.e., -0.357**. Therefore, results suggest that the policy shock is 
                                                 
9 The change in credit is from one quarter before the policy was announced over a period of one year 
afterwards and is winsorized (and also the below-introduced Δlog Drawn) at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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orthogonal to firm fundamentals (demand). All these robustness checks will also be 
done for the benchmark models that we present later, but given their very limited 
impact (also then), these will not be mentioned further. 
In Models 4 and 5 we restrict the sample to loans that can be matched to key firm 
variables to make an adequate comparison with the firm-level specifications (where we 
only use firm observables). For the same reason we replace the saturating set of firm * 
bank type fixed effects by firm variables and province and industry fixed effects in 
Model 5. Despite these changes, the coefficients on Dynamic Provision remain very 
similar, which further suggest that the policy shock is orthogonal to demand. 
Figure 2 displays with a black line the estimated coefficient on Dynamic Provision 
for Model 4 when altering the time period over which Δlog Commitment is calculated, 
i.e., from 2000:Q1 to the quarter displayed on the horizontal axis (starting in 1999:Q1 
and finishing in 2003:Q4). The dashed black lines indicate a 10% confidence interval. 
This Figure (and similar later figures) comprises more than what is in Table 2, 
showing the main result over time for each single quarter before and after the 2000 
shock. The estimated coefficient is statistically significant in 2000:Q2 when dynamic 
provisioning was announced and turns also economically more relevant in 2000:Q3, 
when it started to be enforced (this lack of any significant pre-shock trend in the 
estimated coefficients is consistent with unreported simple plots indicating that banks 
made additional provisions only after the policy introduction; see also Figure 1). In 
sum, banks with higher dynamic provisions cut their total credit commitment more to 
the same firm at the same time after the policy shock (as compared to before the 
shock) than banks with lower dynamic provisioning requirements. 
To further allay endogeneity concerns, we also analyze the difference between those 
banks that are and those that are not subject to dynamic provision requirements in 
Spain. The regulated banks are the domestic banks and the foreign bank subsidiaries, 
while the foreign bank branches were not regulated in this regard and hence not 
affected. We perform such an analysis in a difference in difference setting with either a 
dummy variable (regulated or not; upper panel in Figure 3) or a continuous variable 
(equal to zero if not regulated and, if the bank was regulated, by how it had to increase 
provisioning based on the formula; not reported). We again include firm fixed effects 
for each quarter. The estimates confirm that affected banks contract lending. We also 
study the group of few foreign banks by itself, leaving us with a substantially reduced 
sample, and also find stronger effects for banks that are regulated (and that increase 
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dynamic provisions) than those that are not (see the lower panel in Figure 3). Also, to 
further allay endogeneity concerns,10 when we exclude for robustness the savings or 
the very large banks, the estimated coefficients are very similar. 
In Model 6 we replace Dynamic Provision(1998:Q4) with the Dynamic Provision 
Funds in 2001:Q3, which is the level of dynamic provisioning actually chosen by the 
bank during the impact period, instrumented with the until-now-employed and 
formula-determined Dynamic Provision(1998:Q4). The estimated coefficient in the 
first stage equals 0.711*** (the instrument does not suffer from a weak-instrument 
problem), while the estimated coefficient from the second stage equals -0.558***, 
which implies an impact of Dynamic Provision(1998:Q4) on lending of -0.397 (=0.711 
x -0.558) which is very similar to the one-stage coefficient estimates. 
Finally, we turn to a two stage model that allows the effect of changes in dynamic 
provisioning in lending to go through the changes in the specific and general funds. 
For organizational clarity we display the estimates in Model 1 of a new Table 3 (which 
will be augmented with very similar exercises from the other shocks). The changes in 
Dynamic Provision(1998:Q4) have an almost one-for-one effect in terms of the 
changes in the specific and general funds. The estimated coefficient equals 0.930*** 
(again the instrument does not suffer from a weak-instrument problem). The changes 
in those funds then result in committed lending with an estimated coefficient of -
0.427***, for an overall impact of dynamic provisioning of -0.397 (= 0.930 x -0.427). 
Hence, dynamic provisioning by increasing overall provisions reduces credit supply. 
Models 7 to 11 in Table 2 show that after the introduction of dynamic provisioning 
banks also tighten credit drawn (though it is potentially firm demand driven), maturity, 
collateralization, continuation, and credit drawn over committed (which reflects cost of 
                                                 
10 The dynamic provisioning formula treats opposite risk stemming from buckets and from current specific 
provisions, where the first one increases the dynamic provisions and the second one does not. To investigate 
this issue, we split both dynamic provisioning credit categories and specific provision into two risk classes for 
each bank, high and low. Consequently we have four different coefficients on dynamic provisioning: βHH, 
βHL, βLH, and βLL (the first capital letter indicating the category of dynamic provisioning, the second the 
level of the specific provision). We expect βHL≤βHH≤βLH and βHL≤βLL≤βLH (recall that β is expected to 
be negative, so that the absolute value of βHL should be the highest). Excluding βLH from the estimation, we 
obtain the estimated coefficients of βHL (equal to -0.23***), βHH (equal to -0.061*) and βLL (equal to -
0.034); results are further not tabulated. These results imply that it is the “formula” – i.e., the tightening of 
dynamic provisioning requirements – and not bank risk per se – that affects credit supply after the 
introduction of the policy. We obtain the same result if in our benchmark model we introduce the specific 
provision for the bank and its interaction with dynamic provisioning DP. We then find that the coefficients on 
dynamic provisioning itself are -0.468*** and 41.538* for its interaction with the specific provision, 
implying that a more severe tightening of requirements results in a lowering of the credit supply, but that the 
effects are mitigated if the bank already has in place higher ex ante specific provisions. 
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credit given that firms with at least two credit lines will in general draw more after the 
shock from banks with cheaper credit). Hence, banks tighten all credit supply terms.11 
Next we investigate heterogeneous effects across bank and firms. Table 4 tabulates 
the benchmark specifications that also include interactions of dynamic provision with 
lagged: (a) Bank total assets, capital ratio, ROA, and non-performing loan ratio; (b) 
firm total assets, capital ratio, ROA, bad credit history, interest paid and ex-post 
default; and (c) the length of the bank-firm relationship. Results indicate that dynamic 
provisioning cuts committed credit more at smaller banks and for smaller firms. 
Interestingly, ex-ante more levered firms and those that yield a higher interest rate paid 
to the banks are less affected by credit supply restrictions from more affected banks, 
maybe because these banks take on higher risk to compensate for their increase in the 
cost of capital and the lowering of bank profits (in line with some theoretical 
predictions), or due to their higher policy capital buffers. Moreover, the reduction in 
credit supply by banks with higher dynamic provisioning is lower to firms that default 
more ex-post. This result is only significant if we do not control for the interaction of 
provisioning and ex-ante firm yield, but the coefficients on the interaction with yield 
and leverage remain similar in size and significant. This suggests not only that banks 
with higher dynamic provisioning steer more credit to firms with higher yield, leverage 
and default, but also that ex-ante yield and leverage captures well ex-post default.  
All in all, these findings are consistent with a search for yield by the banks triggered 
by the introduction of dynamic provisioning. An important caveat is that banks are not 
price takers in their lending as compared to investing in bonds from large corporations 
or countries, as e.g. banks could have some monopolistic power in lending; though all 
the results are very similar, or even stronger, if we restrict the loans for each firm to 
the banks which are not its main lender. Finally, in Model 2 in Table 4 we add bank 
fixed effects, and results are virtually unaffected, suggesting that unobserved bank 
heterogeneity is unlikely to account for the variation in credit supply observed. 
3. Firm-Level Results 
Loan-level results imply a cut of credit supply; however, effects could be mitigated if 
firms can obtain credit from the less affected banks. Hence, to assess this macro effect 
of dynamic provisioning we turn to firm-level estimations. The first model is: 
                                                 
11 Dynamic Provision is statistically significant on Loan Dropped? for an impact period extending past 
2002:Q3 (not reported), because if loans with a long maturity are not repaid, the dependent variable is zero. 
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∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶(2000:𝑄𝑄1 − 2001𝑄𝑄: 2)𝑏𝑏= 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 1998:𝑄𝑄4)𝑏𝑏 + 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 +  𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏 (3) 
where ∆𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶(2000:𝑄𝑄1 − 2001:𝑄𝑄2)𝑏𝑏 is the change in the logarithm of 
(strictly positive) committed credit by all banks to firm f, 𝛿𝛿𝑝𝑝 and 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 are the province 
and industry fixed effects, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑆 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺(𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 1998:𝑄𝑄4)𝑏𝑏 is the same dynamic 
provisioning variable as before for all banks that were lending to the firm f prior to the 
introduction (weighting each bank value by its loan volume to firm f prior to the shock 
over total bank loans taken by this firm), and 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑏𝑏 include other bank, bank-firm 
relationship and firm characteristics for all banks of firm f. 𝜀𝜀𝑏𝑏  is the error term. 
Because the analysis is at the firm level, firm fixed effects cannot be included; 
however, we know from the loan level regressions that the estimated coefficients are 
identical with and without controlling for firm fixed effects. Hence, controlling for 
firm variables is enough to control for all firm fundamentals. 
The obtained credit after the shock can be from both “current” and “non-current” 
banks (that did not lend to the firm prior to the shock). Hence we analyze whether 
firms are able to absorb the impact of the shock (that was affecting the banks they were 
borrowing from prior to the shock) by obtaining more credit from both current and/or 
non-current banks. The sample and basis periods are the same as for the loan-level 
analysis. The standard errors are clustered at the main bank level (and triple clustered 
at the first, second and third main bank level in robustness). 
In Models 12 to 16 in Table 2 we consecutively regress our main dependent credit 
variable at the firm level, i.e., Δlog Commitment (2000:Q1-2001:Q2), in addition to 
Δlog Drawn (2000:Q1-2001:Q2), and firm Δlog Total Assets (1999:Q4-2001:Q4), 
Δlog Employees (1999:Q4-2001:Q4), and Firm Death? (2001) on Dynamic Provision 
(1998:Q4)f. For the main credit variable, Models 12 and 13, the estimated coefficients 
on Dynamic Provision are insignificant. The gray lines in Figure 2 show that the 
coefficients on Dynamic Provision are never significant (though economically 
significant only in the first quarters but with p-values of 20%), thus suggesting that in 
good times firms can swiftly turn to different banks outside the set of current banks 
that were employed prior to the introduction or even sufficiently shift borrowing 
within this set of current banks to less affected ones. Granting of loan applications by 
new banks is relatively high in good times (Figure 4). Consistent with this view, we 
find no real effects on firm total assets, employment, or survival in Models 14 to 16. 
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In sum, results show that dynamic provisioning in good times can reduce the supply 
of credit by the affected banks but that the impact on firm financing and performance 
seems low. Hence dynamic provisioning introduced at the right time can be a potent 
countercyclical tool that modifies banks’ lending behavior, but that is also fairly 
benign in its impact on firms. On other hand, there are some unanticipated effects of 
the policy: Tighter capital requirements can induce risk-taking by regulated banks and 
regulatory arbitrage by non-regulated banks (foreign branches), the latter undoing part 
of the policy as regulatory arbitrage usually does. However, the higher supply of credit 
by non-regulated banks and by regulated-but-less-affected banks substantially mitigate 
the negative credit and real effects at the firm level (the 4 pp difference in loan level 
credit, absence an effect on firm level credit, means that the difference does not arise 
entirely because banks with higher provisioning cut lending by the full 4 pp). 
IV. IN BAD TIMES: DYNAMIC PROVISION FUNDS AND CRISIS, FLOOR 
LOWERING, AND NEW REQUIREMENTS 
1. The Specifics of the Crisis Shock and the Floor Lowering 
We now turn to the analysis in bad times when the countercyclical nature of dynamic 
provisioning was operational by the unexpected crisis shock (as the dynamic provision 
flow turns negative and the stock starts to decline) and two further policy shocks 
decreased the provisioning floor. For the crisis shock we calculate how much each 
bank had built up as dynamic provision funds (over assets) just prior to the onset of the 
crisis in Spain. The variable Dynamic Provision Funds(2007:Q4) varies across banks, 
with a mean of 1.17 and a standard deviation that equals 0.23 (see Table 5 for 
summary statistics). The lowering in 2008:Q4 of the floor of provision funds from 33 
to 10% and in 2009:Q4 to 0% affected mostly the banks that had not reached the 
maximum in their dynamic provision funds before.12 It is captured by the dummy 
variable d(Dynamic Provision Funds<1.25), which equals one if the dynamic 
provision funds is below the ceiling of 125% of latent loan losses just before the policy 
shock, and equals zero otherwise, with a mean value of 0.61. For the quarter-on-
quarter time-varying results, this variable is calculated in each quarter.  
                                                 
12 Banks that the formula states that their provisions funds should be higher than the ceiling can have 
provision funds at the ceiling, but due to the higher formula value, they cannot immediately release funds 
since their theoretical value is even higher than the ceiling. Therefore, these banks are less affected 
immediately after the floor was reduced or eliminated. 
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2. Loan-Level Results 
The variable Dynamic Provision Funds and d(Dynamic Provision Funds<1.25) 
replace Dynamic Provision in Equation 2, but otherwise the estimated models in Table 
6 run in parallel with those in Table 2. For example in Models 1 to 5 we regress Δlog 
Commitment from 2008:Q1 to 2010:Q4 on the two dynamic provisioning variables and 
the indicated sets of controls. Both coefficients are positive, statistically and 
economically significant. Take again Model 4 saturated with firm * bank type fixed 
effects. The estimated coefficient on Dynamic Provision Funds equals 0.348***, 
which implies that one standard deviation more in terms of funds (i.e., 0.23) delivers 8 
pp more credit growth between 2008:Q1 and 2010:Q4, and that at a bank with a mean 
level of funds (i.e., 1.17%) lending grew by almost 41 pp more than at a bank with 
zero funds. The estimated coefficient on d(Dynamic Provision Funds<1.25) equals 
0.125***, implying that lending at banks below their ceiling grew by 13 pp more. 
Figure 5 again crucially displays the estimated coefficients (and confidence intervals) 
for Model 4 for each quarter from 2008:Q1 to 2010:Q4. The graphs show that the 
estimates for Dynamic Provision Funds are permanently positive during the crisis, 
statistically significant over all horizons after the start of the crisis, and higher values 
in 2010 than in the beginning of the crisis. Figure 6 shows the impact of two floor 
reductions on credit commitment. The highest positive effects are for the two quarters 
when the policy shocks take place (and for the first shock, effects are also statistically 
significant in the preceding quarter when the reduction was announced and in the 
quarter after).13 Note that at the beginning of the crisis, the second main variable has 
relatively stronger effect than the first one, also as compared to the 2010 period. 
Returning to Table 6, results are similar when we perform the robustness tests as in 
Table 2 or putting one variable alone (not reported) and when instrumenting (in Model 
6) the actual Dynamic Provision Funds in 2007:Q4 with the simulated funds fixing the 
bank loan portfolio in 2000:Q3! By instrumenting with the part explained by the 
regulation (the formula) applied to the portfolio seven years earlier (i.e., the moment of 
introduction of dynamic provisions) we remove the potentially endogenous part (banks 
could have dynamically provisioned more than required by regulation) in 2007:Q4. 
                                                 
13  Only banks with DPF below 125% were allowed to immediately release funds. In a regression 
discontinuity setup we find the floor reductions in 2008:Q3/4 and 2009:Q4 to spur banks below 125% to 
increase the supply of credit more than banks above in the theoretical value of the formula (estimates 
available upon request). Results are also similar if we use alternative measures, e.g., dummies for the lower 
25 or 50% in DPF. Almost all banks maintain positive buffers possibly to avoid a binding regulatory limit 
(e.g., Flannery and Rangan (2008)). 
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The estimated coefficient in the first stage equals 0.634***, and the instrument does 
not suffer from a weak-instrument problem. The pass-through effect of Dynamic 
Provision Funds in 2007:Q4 now equals 0.466 (= 0.634 x 0.735). We also again turn 
to the two stage model that allows the effect of changes in dynamic provisioning in 
lending to go through the changes in the specific and general funds. The estimates are 
in Model 2 in the previously introduced Table 3. Controlling for bank risk measures, 
the changes in Dynamic Provision Funds/Assets(2007:Q4) have now an estimated 
coefficient equal to -0.866***. The changes in those funds then result in committed 
lending with an estimated coefficient that equals -0.335**, for an overall impact of 
dynamic provision funds that equals 0.290 (= -0.866 x -0.335). Therefore, 
countercyclical capital buffers work positively on credit supply via saving on capital in 
crisis times (when bank profits and shareholder funds’ access are scarce). 
Results are very similar for drawn credit (Model 7), drawn to committed (Model 11) 
and for the extensive margin of loan continuation (Model 8). But interestingly, these 
same banks also shorten loan maturity (Model 9) and increase collateral requirements 
(Model 10) in both a statistically significant and economically relevant manner; 
possibly to compensate for the higher risk they take by lending more during the crisis. 
In Table 7 we turn to the effects across bank and firm characteristics. The impact of 
the provisioning on credit supply was absorbed best by well-capitalized banks with a 
low NPL ratio. Hence, highly leveraged banks with high NPLs ratios may face a 
capital requirement in the market that is higher and hence more binding than the 
regulatory requirement. A loosening of the regulatory requirement may therefore have 
a more muted effect on credit supply for those riskier banks. The floor lowering also 
led banks below the ceiling to grant more credit supply to firms with less equity or 
longer time with the bank, consistent with risk-shifting (gambling for resurrection and 
zombie lending). Hence, both credit (including risk-shifting) and real effects are not 
the same when the regulator increases requirements in good times to have higher 
buffers in bad times than when the regulator just lowers requirements in bad times. 
3. Firm-Level Results 
The firm-level estimates in Models 12 to 16 in Table 6 (and Figure 5) suggest firms 
cannot substitute for the impact of dynamic provisioning we document at the loan 
level. In Model 12 for example the estimated coefficient on Dynamic Provision Funds 
equals 0.092**, implying that firms dealing with banks holding 1 pp more in pre-crisis 
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funds receive 9 pp more in committed credit than when dealing with other banks, 
partly offsetting the contraction in committed borrowing by 34% for the mean firm. 
Figure 5 (the gray lines in the upper panel) show this effect is permanent, statistically 
significant and large, though the effect stabilizes over 2010 (probably because funds 
start depleting, see Section 4 below). All in all, given that we control for bank and firm 
characteristics and, in the loan-level regressions, the coefficients in the models with 
firm fixed effects and the models with firm variables are not statistically different, the 
firm-level results can be interpreted as being driven by credit supply. 
There are important real effects associated. Employment growth at firms borrowing 
from banks with higher pre-crisis buffers relatively increases during the crisis period. 
The estimated coefficient of 0.056* (Model 15) implies a 6 pp higher growth for each 
1 pp more in funds (mean growth was -14%). Firm survival is similarly affected. The 
estimate of -0.013** in Model 16 implies that a 1 pp higher pre-crisis buffer results in 
a 1 pp higher likelihood of survival. As Figure 4 shows for the granting of loan 
applications, substitution of banks is more difficult in bad times than in good times. 
The estimated coefficients on the floor variables (Figure 6), though statistically 
significant around the quarters related to the floor reductions, turn statistically 
insignificant over the entire impact period. Consistent with these results, we find no 
real effects associated to the floor reductions over the whole 2008-10 period. 
4. Increase in General Provisions in 2012 
The last shock we analyze is a change in the law in 2012:Q1 and Q2 that increased 
the provisions that banks needed to make on all their (performing and non-performing) 
lending exposure to construction and real-estate firms as of 2011:Q4.14 The increase in 
provisions could be accomplished until the end of 2012 and Figure 1 shows this large 
increase of around 85 billion in provisioning, which is around 8.5% of annual GDP 
(and compared to 20 billion one year before). We investigate the impact of the pre-
shock bank-level exposure to construction and real-estate firms on its lending to non-
construction or real-estate related firms. Construction & Real-Estate/Total Loans to 
                                                 
14 In February 2012 banks had to provision 7% for all performing loans related to construction and the real 
estate sector in their portfolio. In May 2012 these provisions were increased by law depending on the nature 
of the assets: An additional 45% for land, 7% for real estate developments completed, and 22% for real estate 
developments in progress. Hence these provisions constituted a one-time ad hoc increase. The law also 
tightened provisioning for non-performing construction and real estate loans. All these provisions were 
charged by the banks as specific provisions by 2012:Q4. 
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Firms(2011:Q4) replaces Dynamic Provision in Equation 2, but otherwise Table 9 
lines up with Table 2 (see Table 8 for the summary statistics). 
In Models 1 to 5 we regress Δlog Commitment from 2011:Q4 to 2012:Q4 on the 
construction and real-estate exposure variable and the indicated sets of characteristics 
and fixed effects. The estimated coefficients are in all cases negative, statistically 
significant, and economically relevant. In Model 4 for example the estimated 
coefficient on this variable equals -0.352***, which implies that one standard 
deviation more exposure (i.e., 0.08) results in 3 pp less growth in lending to non-
construction or real-estate firms between 2011:Q4 and 2012:Q4, a sizable effect given 
that committed lending to these firms contracted on average by 15%. Crucially, this 
effect is again permanent (over 2012 and 2013) as Figure 7 demonstrates, and it can be 
traced through the increase in the overall provisioning as Model 3 in Table 3 shows. 
Moreover, the increase in provisioning imposed on banks leads to a statistically 
significant contraction in credit drawn, shortening in maturity and tightening of 
collateralization requirements (Model 6, 8, 9, Table 9). Also, given that real estate 
assets are affected in the crisis, it is important to note that all the results are only 
significant after (and not before) the policy change, as Figure 7 shows. 
Importantly, at the firm level committed credit falls (Models 11 and 12, and Figure 
7), while firm death increases (no balance sheet data are yet available). For firms 
dealing with banks that are average in terms of their lending to construction and real-
estate firms (i.e., equal to 0.36) the tightening in requirements means a contraction in 
committed credit at the firm level by at least 4 pp and a 1 pp lower likelihood of 
survival. These estimates vividly demonstrate the costs associated with a required 
increase in capital in crisis times. Again analyzing the granting of loan applications 
shows the difficulty of substituting banks in crisis times (Figure 4). 
Finally, compositional changes in credit supply are again interesting (Table 10). 
Banks with higher requirements expand relatively more supply of credit to firms with 
lower profits, with a bad credit history and (marginally significant) with longer 
relationship, though these banks also expand to firms with lower yield (though it could 
be consistent with risk-shifting as zombie lending can imply a lower interest rate, so 
that the firm reduces the risk of default). Moreover, contractive effects are overall 
weaker for lowly capitalized banks with high ratio of NPLs. These results are 
consistent with risk-shifting (including zombie lending). 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
We study the effects of dynamic provisioning (pro-cyclical capital requirements 
generating countercyclical bank capital buffers) on the supply of credit to firms and 
their real performance in good and bad times. Spain in the period between 1999 and 
2013 offers an excellent setting to empirically identify these effects, given the many 
policy experiments with dynamic provisioning (generating time-variant bank-specific 
shocks), the full credit cycle with an unexpected crisis shock to test the countercyclical 
nature of the policy, and the unique micro data that is available. 
Our results overall show that dynamic provisioning mitigates credit supply cycles, 
with strong positive aggregate firm-level credit, employment and survival effects in 
crisis times, when switching from banks with low to high capital buffers and to other 
sources of finance is difficult. Our results suggest that the mechanism at work is 
through saving capital, as in crisis times bank profits and new shareholder funds to 
raise new capital are scarce and costly. While the effect on credit supplied by a specific 
bank to a specific firm is always economically strong, in good times dynamic 
provisioning is substantially weaker in halting a credit boom at the firm level as firms 
switch to less affected banks, including banks outside the regulatory perimeter (i.e., 
regulatory arbitrage). Moreover, the results suggest that the introduction of dynamic 
provisioning also leads banks to increase risk and search for yield, an unintended 
consequence of the policy indeed. Yet despite these system weaknesses, the bank 
buffers build up in good times clearly helped to mitigate the credit crunch in bad times, 
when switching banks turns problematic. With respect to upholding real activity and 
avoiding risk-shifting, results suggest it is better to increase capital buffers in good 
times than changing requirements for lowly capitalized banks in crisis times. Though 
the low dynamic provision funds (equaled only around 1.25% of total loans) are good 
for empirical identification, ultimately they were overwhelmed by the crisis. In fact, 
the one-off increase in provisions in 2012 contributed strongly to a credit crunch with 
substantial negative real effects. 
Consequently, our findings hold important implications for macroprudential policy. 
Results indicate that bank procyclicality can be mitigated with countercyclical capital 
buffers, with less need for costly governmental bail-outs and expansive monetary 
policy in crisis times. Basel III requires countercyclical bank capital buffers and our 
findings support the reasoning that prevailed on these issues in Basel, the G20 and in 
some central banks – “Policymakers need to establish that countercyclical policy tools 
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address cyclical vulnerabilities more effectively than simpler tools that are constant 
over the course of the cycle do” (Yellen (2011), p.10). 
Our results are also important for macroeconomic modeling as we show that in bad 
times (as compared also to good times) there are substantial real effects stemming 
from credit supply changes due to bank capital positions. Not only does aggregate 
bank capital matter, but as (we show) firms struggle to switch banks in bad times (due 
to adverse selection for example, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006)), the distribution of 
bank capital per se drives macroeconomic real effects as well. Hence, bank (capital) 
heterogeneity matters for macroeconomics. Moreover, heterogeneity also matters 
across time, banks, firms and loans. For example, banks differentially affected by 
policy change their composition of supply of credit, as in macroeconomic models with 
more than one lending opportunity (Matsuyama (2007)). In addition, our results also 
suggest that not only policy constraints on capital matter, but also market constraints 
(weaker effects in crisis times for banks with higher NPLs and leverage). 
Finally, our results inform the recent and contentious debate among academics, 
bankers and policy makers on higher bank capital requirements and its impact on the 
supply of credit and the associated real effects for the overall economy (Hanson et al. 
(2011), Admati and Hellwig (2013)). Witness in particular how overall effects were 
benign in good times, how the last policy experiment of tightening provisioning in the 
midst of the crisis was followed by a severe credit crunch with a matching real 
contraction, and how having plentiful pre-crisis capital buffers sustained credit and real 
activity in crisis times by obviating the need for raising capital precisely then when 
bank profits are low and access to shareholder funds is costly. In sum, our evidence 
suggests bank capital should be raised in good times, not in bad times. 
However, the supply of credit to more leveraged firms with higher yields can 
increase, hence higher bank capital may not always imply lower bank moral hazard 
(Gale (2010)). On the other hand, there is behavior consistent with risk-shifting when 
changing capital requirements in crisis times to banks with low capital. Therefore, on 
risk-taking and regulatory arbitrage, both crucial for financial stability, our approach 
per se suggests that supervisors should collect exhaustive micro data and track – i.e., 
supervise – in real time potential deviations from policy intentions. 
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